This paper will consider developments in the Syrian and Iraqi battlespaces that may be conceptualised as relevant to the broader evolution in military affairs. A brief discussion of different notions of "revolution" and "evolution" (in Military Affairs) will be offered, followed by an overview of the combatant actors involved in engagements in the battlespace concerned. The analysis distinguishes at the start between two different evolutionary processes: one specific to the local theatre of war in which local combatants, heavily constrained by their circumstances and limitations, show innovation with limited resources and means, and with very high (existential) stakes. This actually existential evolutionary process is complicated by the effects of the only quasi-evolutionary process of major powers' interactions (with each other and with local combatants). The latter process is quasi-evolutionary in the sense that it does not carry direct existential stakes for the central players involved in it. The stakes are in a sense virtual: being a function of the prospects of imagined peer-competitor military conflict. Key cases studied in the course of the discussion include (inter alia) the evolution of the Syrian Arab Air Force's use of so-called barrel bombs as well as the use of land-attack cruise missiles and other high-end weaponry by major intervening powers.
With new scientific revolutions underway, and while humanity awaits to see and at least partly understand the significance of developments in biotechnology, nanotechnology and Artificial Intelligence that are already happening, the above perspective is understandable -yet it requires critical examination in light of a fundamental contradiction that is inherent to the idea of RMA. With the rise of networks, emphasised by RMA theorists themselves, hierarchically organised actors, especially state actors, may eventually be at a disadvantage against asymmetrical adversaries (Arquilla and Ronfeldt, 2001) . RMA theorists thus often talk of the decline of the nationstate which then raises the question: why should one be focused on "peer competitors"?
Regardless of whether network structures enjoy a systemic advantage today, or whether the nation-state is entirely obsolete and bound to dissolve, state powers have historically often had to confront non-state adversaries in the kind of strategic engagement where their technological advantages counted for little -the US military's experience in Iraq (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) being a case in point. The kind of asymmetrical warfare that is frequently seen in insurgencies can be adapted and even state actors can harness some of its benefits when facing stronger or more advanced rivals. Information warfare, propaganda, intelligence and espionage, cyber-operations as well as lawfare 2 can be used to gamechanging effect.
That we speak today of "hybrid war" 3 -something actually not very new (seen e.g. in the context of the Vietnam War as well, to offer but one example) -shows how this adaptation is really taking place. Once we conclude that RMA induces effective adaptive processes, it is but one further step to conclude that there is constant evolution, and that instead of technological change taking us suddenly to an entirely new level of warfare, methods of overcoming adversaries familiar from the historical past persist in their effectiveness in a changed environment.
It may be tempting to think of this "military" evolution (shaped often not by militaries but by actually very differently organised actors) as "intelligent design" where adaptation is non-random, but if we are to place it on a spectrum from complete randomness to non-randomness, what we find should be placed somewhere in-between in reality.
A telling and useful study in this respect is the analysis by Castaldi, Fontana and Nuvolari (2009) of the evolution of tanks from the end of World War I up to WWII. They show how key parametres such as speed (with reference to different kinds of mobility, i.e. strategic, operational and battlefield mobility), armour and armament calibre form an interdependent set of variables that designers tried to manipulate in the interest of adaptation, similarly to how nature re-arranges the characteristics of the entire population of a species -but in this case in an intelligent process of course. The attempt at controlling the impact on the environment and configuring optimal adaptation to the conditions on the battlefield is, however, complicated by a host of factors. Known as well as unknown 2 Lawfare generally refers to how actors look to take strategic advantage of normative factors, e.g. humanitarian law or other norms, for instance by making the adversary's actions look worse than their own in a moral sense. 3 Hybrid war is the nowadays popular expression used typically to describe the presence of a mixture of regular and irregular approaches to war in situations that may not even be characterised as clearly constituting war -in peacetime -with peacetime strategic tools of conflict such as propaganda and opportunistic diplomacy. produce adaptation to survival requirements in at least six (interdependent) dimensions, and between multiple (often conflicing or disagreeing) actors, the outcomes of battlefield evolution seem more random. This bird's eye view of battlefield evolution awakens one to the reality that in spite of noble intellectual efforts, war is indeed messy, its results are difficult to control, it is ususally not purely the continuation of politics and policy by other means, and the selection of winners and losers may not be too dissimilar to the process of natural selection.
The local evolutionary process
With reference to William Lind's classification of "generations of warfare" (Lind, 2004) , the conflict in the Syrian/Iraqi theatre is best seen as a blend of the generations. There is both a war of attrition on several fronts (2nd generation warfare), with slowly (if at all) moving lines of engagement, but there is also the element of 4GW (Fourth Generation Warfare) in the form of subversion and terrorist attacks and the use of very irregular tactics. Fixed lines exist in places, for example in urban environments, in spite of the superiority of the Syrian Arab Forces (i.e. government forces) in certain respects: e.g. in the field of tactical air support, area-effect weapons and rolling armour. This is because a built-up environment allows for enough protection against firepower to make advances even by a better equipped force difficult (if possible at all). Elsewhere, lesser actors respond with counter-mobility tactics, including the layered use of IEDs, and the extensive construction of berms, trenches and tunnels (Hubbard, 2015; Blake, 2015) .
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Siege situations are also common, and, depending on the allocation of the respective sides' resources, the besieged may belong to various parties: government garrisons as well as opposition-held towns were frequently surrounded and pressured in the course of the war, resulting in an especially dire humanitarian situation and a large number of civilian casualties -partly due to the use of indiscriminate or deliberately terroristic tactics by the various parties.
Against this backdrop, it is interesting to take a look at the evolution of the use of so-called "barrel bombs" by the Syrian Arab Air Force (SAAF). Two hypotheses may be formulated related to what is behind their use as a tactic. It is a typical interpretation in media reports to write this off as "collective punishment," designed to "deter and depopulate" opposition-held areas whose population government forces do not really seek to protect (Kozak, 2015: 9) . The null-hypothesis, in contrast, is that any tactic in war, especially where resources are scarce, 7 has to have some direct use in overcoming an adversary -otherwise it is but an ill-affordable expression of emotions.
6 Transnational terrorism has also been used in retaliatory form by the Islamic State at least in the case of the November 2015 Paris attacks to which the IS command's direct connections seem to be the most strongly established (Arany, N. Rózsa and Szalai, 2017: 50) . The brutal execution of captured combatants also carries some deterrent effect and may thus be seen and understood as forming a part of warfare repertoires in this context where combatant parties join the fight with highly asymmetrical capabilities. 7 A set of conditions that may be theorised as generally enhancing comparatively innovative practices and, per consequence, evolutionary processes in warfare (the author wishes to thank Máté Szalai for raising this point).
It may be worth noting in advance of examining these two propositions that combatant identification from aerial platforms in an urban environment is difficult in any case, resulting in difficulties with precise targeting -just as it is well known from experience that needless atrocities often happen in the course of violent conflict.
Supplying strong evidence in favour of the first hypothesis (excessive destruction and violence) is the high number of civilian casualties, the oft-observable low precision of the air strikes (specific targeting may be altogether absent in many instances, with, frequently, certain districts and large residential buildings constituting the target of attack). "Double tap attacks" are also documented to have taken place -this tactic is clearly illegitimate as the second (repeat) strike in the same location cannot reasonably be expected to be non-harmful to search-and-rescue and medical personnel. Barrel bombs are also typically used as area-effect weapons, with scrap metal filled into the body of the bomb to spray the targeted area with shrapnel. Similarly in order to affect a larger area, barrel bombs are very likely to have been used with a chemical payload in a number of instances and as (high-explosive) Fuel-Air Weapons (Higgins, 2015) .
It is also possible, however, to identify certain arguments and considerations in favour of the null-hypothesis (battlespace rationality). It is, for instance, a misunderstanding related to "barrel bombs" that they are all made of oil barrels -they are more precisely called improvised aerial bombs, as they can be (and are) built from various different kinds of basic components. It is similarly wrong to think that the use of these weapons is unprecedented. Air forces in need have used them extensively in the past, including Israel against Arab forces in the first Arab-Israeli war, or Croatia against rumpYugoslavia in the 1990s, to name but a few examples (Bodetti, 2015) . "Need" in the above sentence is key: an air force lacking precision aerial bombs (Precision-Guided Munitions or PGMs) as well as an environment where combatant identification is difficult and difficult-to-identify/low-value targets proliferate may both create this need.
That the SAAF is interested in getting some precision in its targeting is evidenced by the details of the evolution of this tactic. Initially only very primitive barrel bombs were used (from 2012 already). The fuse was lit by crude means (in one widely shared video a Syrian soldier lights the fuse with his cigarette 8 ). The lit fuse was hoped to create an explosion at around the time of impact, but in fact often failed to do this, leading to premature aerial explosions, or bombs remaining unexploded ("dud"). Beginning towards the end of 2013, and reportedly with the help of Iranian engineers, barrel bombs have been redesigned for improved flight stability (with the introduction of tail fins) and impact fuses (for reliable explosion upon impact). Typically, a three-fin arrangement came to be used instead of a symmetrical four-fin design -this is due not to lack of interest in optimal solutions but platform limitations: this is how the bomb can be comparatively easily slid out the back of SAAF helicopters. It is also signficant that the helicopters typically need to operate from a higher-than-ideal altitude because of the presence of aerial defence weapons in the hand of hostile factions, including MANPADS (Man-Portable Air Defence Systems) or shoulder-fired ground-to-air missiles, resulting in decreased accuracy in targeting.
With a view to the evolution seen in Syria, it is instructive to look at the example Kalibr missile (Tzoneva, 2016) . It is difficult to judge if the use of these weapons systems was absolutely required against the targets that they were spent on, but a number of benefits external to such considerations can be identified easily. Both cruise missiles were combat-tested in 2015 for the first time. There has also been some rumoured interest in buying Kalibr missiles by weapons importers -demonstrating the missile's capabilities may thus have been useful in an economic sense. Moreover, demonstrating the use of these LACMs from both the Mediterranean and the Caspean Seas showed Russian powerprojection capability in the Middle East from two directions. Even if the Black Sea was somehow closed off to Russia, it would still have this capability -highlighting its importance as a player in the region. Furthermore, LACMs are an important part of Russia's arsenal, potentially even in a nuclear conflict. In the absence of air superiority and the ability to operationally safely deliver bombs to above enemy targets with its aircraft, low-observable cruise missiles with or without a nuclear warhead are an important punch they can pull in a fight (Sokov, 2015) .
Mingling with the locals: Actual strategic adaptation on the part of global actors
The challenge of the proliferation of difficult-to-identify/low-value (DI/LV) targets is one that eventually air forces more advanced than the SAAF also had to face in their air operations over Syria and Iraq. This brought about a full reconfiguration of Russian air operations in Syria by March 2016, and produced some spectacular decisions in the US case as well.
The realisation of the need for aerial assets capable of using cheaper options to take out DI/LV targets, with more loitering time, and giving a better opportunity to observe the environment over the area of prospective targets, led to Russia take its jet bombers out of Syria (e.g. the Sukhoi Su-24s and Su-25s) and bring in combat helicopters (Bronk, 2016) . Living up to Soviet/Russian traditions in this respect, a competitive situation was created whereby the Kamov Ka-52 and the Mil Mi-24 are both seeing their combat debut in Syria, using weaponry that saw only limited combat testing in Chechnya so far, such as the Ataka and Vikhr missiles which these helicopters can carry (Karnozov, 2016) . As in the case of LACMs, here as well, Russia can count on arms-exports-related benefits given Egypt's and other prospective buyers' interest in these platforms and the weapons systems that can be used along with them (Akulov, 2016) .
As to the United States: in its air campaign against the Islamic State, the A-10
Warthogs only joined operations towards the later part of 2014. Initially F-16s and F-15s, multi-role aircraft, were flying most of the combat sorties against emerging targets. These planes are limited in terms of the minimum speed at which they have to conduct an air strike, the time they can spend above target, and the range of weapons systems they can use against hostile forces on the ground. It was thus a logical decision to bring in the A10s which immediately led to improvements in the mentioned dimensions. By midJanuary 2015 the Warthogs flew 11% of the combat sorties against the Islamic State, quickly making up for the delay in their entry in-theatre (Mehta, 2015) . Related to this, and also with a view to experiences from Afghanistan, the service time of the A-10s has been extended into the 2020s (Prigg, 2016 ). An even more interesting decision was the experimental introduction of the OV-10 Bronco, a turbo-prop Vietnam-era combat aircraft over Iraq, a return to something that actually works quite well against hostile forces with limited air defence capabilities (Browne, 2016) . Having mentioned the A-10s and the OV-10s, a very important role in combat support rests with the AH-64 Apache helicopters as well.
The need for these types of aerial platforms is thus, by now, obvious even to advanced air forces addicted to the idea of the Revolution in Military Affairs, investing in "next generations" of fighter aircraft that have relevance primarily in the quasievolutionary process of preparing for possible peer-to-peer (i.e. major-power) conflict.
This need is all the more obvious to actors without a similar abundance of resourceslooking beyond the Syria/Iraqi theatre it is instructive to see the use of "air tractors"
(agricultural aircraft converted into means of tactical air support) in Libya (Delalande, 2017) .
Conclusion
As the article showed, evolutionary processes can be defined 
